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Social Change and "Neo"-Corporatism: Notes on the Growing
Contradictions between Logistics (Unterbau) and Logics (Überbau)
1.The ambiguity between the two "grand" concepts may be either of a
theoretical or of an empirical nature. In the theoretical sense "social chan-
qe and "neo"-corporatism may suffer from conceptual underdevelopment and/or
operational undermeasurement: it will not be easy then to spell out the theo¬
retical connections. On the other hand, the empirical "traces" of something
like "neo"corporatism may appear to have such a gradually or incrementalist-
ically operating "face" that it is not a simple affair to trace convincingly
its macro impact, i.e. to trace the changing properties of societal decision
making associated with the revival of some (modern) form of corporatism.
Then, moreover, remains the puzzle which emergent properties are considered
"reasonably" structural enough to be honoured with the qualification "real"
social change.
Several contradictions or countervailing tendencies may be observed in
the articulation of interests that underlie the authoritative allocation of
societal values in modern western society. One of the more conspicuous trends
- to be worked out further - seems to be the relative decline of the "author¬
itative" component in the allocation of societal values. Instead, a relative
(re-?)emergence of a strong pragmatic-improvisatory component seems on its
way ahead. ßut - as we hope to make clear - the chance to observe processes
of decline-and-emergence depends on the unit of analysis one chooses, i.e.
on the level of organizational-institutional aggregation one takes into
account.
Admitting for several levels of aggregation opens the possibility of
observing conflicting logics of interest articulation. We prefer a theoretic¬
al framework in which this possibility is not mied out a priori, i.e. a
framework as sensitive as possible for detecting and understanding the lack
or non-selfevidence of congruence between the logics of interest represent-
ation as they "hold" on different levels of interest - related decision making
and conflict management. With the logics of interest representation we mean
the principles of subjective rationality and legitimacy that give raeaning and
structure to the strategies of conflict for the protagonists involved in the
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societal allocation game. As we will see below, the subjective principles of
rationality and legitimacy should be distinguished clearly from the objective
logistics based on interorganizational resource-dependence.
In our view, it makes only sense to speculate about such a pretentious
affair like "social change" after having made some preparatory exercises in
the study of ^ub-societal contradictions on different levels of aggregation.
The latter refers to two kinds of contradiction. Different levels of
organizational-institutional aggregation allow - not as a temporary or random
phenomenon - for, first, contradictions among the level-specific symbolic
logics of interest articulation and, secondly: for persistent, and we think
growing contradictions between the material logistics of resource interdepen-
dence (the objective Unterbau) on the one hand and the symbolic logics of
interest representation (the subjective Überbau) on the other hand.
Herewith we have paraphrased the essential structure of this essay.
First, a relative decline of the authoritative component and the rise of a
pragmatic-improvisatory component may be observed in the allocation of social
values. Secondly and related to the first point: contradictions between the
symbolic logics of interest representation on different levels of aggregation
become institutionalized. Third, - and following from our second point -
contradictions between the material logistics of resource interdependence
(Unterbau) vis ä vis the symbolic logics of interest representation (Überbau)
will be one of the more intriguing consequences for the political-economic
Order as a whole. These consequences are serious enough to qualify them as
social change of the existing order.
One, admittedly too rudimentary normative remark on a deraocratically
inspired countermove, rounds off the essay.
2. Social change may be conceived of as a change in the structure of
"authority" defining the Parameters for the (re-)production and allocation of
values in society. But even then it remains an open question whether this
change in authority-structure will result in a changing value-structure.
Logically there are symmetrical and assymmetrical possibilities: either power
and value structures change (or remain unchanged) in a mutually supportive
way or changes occur in one dimension without necessary or sufficient changes
in the other. Moreover, things are complicated by the possibility of time
lags in the adaptation - if at all - between the cultural dimension and the
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dimension of the division of effective power and authority.
However, as proposed before, a more relevant distinction seems to us
the one that differentiates between different levels of aggregation of organ-
ized interests (e.g. the level of individual firms, industries or subsectors
of the economy, and the economy as a whole) or between different policy sect-
ors in society (e.g. the socio-economic arena versus the public health,
education or abortion-legislation arena). It should be clear that as far and
as long as different logics-of-action hold on different levels of aggregation
or for different policy-arenas, it is not an easy task to formulate generaliz-
ations on the correlation between and the curaulative effects of
changes in the cultural and power dimensions for society as a whole.
Due to a phenomenon that will be elaborated below as the "eclips of
accountability", and due to a certain institutionalization of the deliberate
avoidance of accountability in the modern, democratic welfare State, something
results that may be called mutual immunization or "balkanization" of societal
decision-making related to the production and allocation of values. One may
call this phenomenon horizontal balkanization as far as one has comparisons
in mind between policy-sectors or "Specialized" arenas, whereas relative
immunization between different levels of policy making within on£ policy sect-
or consequently have to be called vertical balkanization.
One caveat should be mentioned before proceeding on the topic of
balkanization: we definitely do not pretend that balkanization is a "new"
phenomenon; what we want to say is that balkanization should be considered a
phenomenon becoraing more visible and spectacular the more a complex and dif-
ferentiated society becomes trapped in interorganizational Verflechtungen.
Interorganizational linkages produce an impressive arsenal of negative and
positive externalities that happened not to exist before. What lends a certain
urgency to the study of interorganizational externalities, is the lack of
correspondence between - at one side
- the largely unplanned, "blind" prolif-
eration of interorganizational linkages and
- at the other side - the (accept-
ed?, trained?) incapacity to take these linkage-induced externalities serious
in overall decision-making. One may reformulate this as a cultural lag as far
as the "subjective" rationalization and legitimation or: logics of the inter¬
organizational game lag behind the "objective" logistics of resource inter-
dependence between organized interests. The phenomenon of balkanization
seems to lend support to the thesis that we have to do here
- for society as
a whole - with a trained or institutionalized incapacity, to translate logist-
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ics into logics, i.e. a certain underdevelopraent of raanagerial-political tools
to match the organization of societal deraands to the organization of commens-
urate Supports.
3. We will mention, first, some of the underlying forces that tend to
produce and to reinforce this gap, in the hope to be able to identify a blind
spot in the "orthodoxy" around the Unterbau-Überbau explanation of social
change. As we substitute the concept of expectations, shared by interdependent
actors in their mutual strategies of conflict (e.g. interest groups, bureau-
cracy, members of parliament) for the notion of shared values, the "idealist-
ic" dichotomy of Unterbau and Überbau can be replaced by the twin concept of
structure-and-strategy. This twin concept takes as a point of departure the
existence of a structure-of-opportunities, i.e. a pararaetric setting leading
to strategies-of-actors froni which values raay be derived, eventually in a
very loose sense, or for which values are used as ideological rationalization
ex post rather than as a rational or ideological ex ante state-of-readiness.
If the notion of a brittle negotiated order of converging and sharing expect¬
ations, rather than "conflict", "harroony" or "consensus" between interdepen¬
dent actors appears to have heuristic and explanatory value, important
consequences follow for the identidication and assessment of neo-corporatist
tendencies in some sectors and on some levels of policy aggregation in modern
society. But we will return to this question later on.
We would like to say something first about the increasing mismatch
between the "objective" logistics of interorganizational dependence versus
the "subjective" rationality or logics of interorganizational decision-
making. The epitheta subjective versus objective are used in Mancur Olson's
sense (M. Olson - The Logic of Collective Action
- Cambridge, London 1975),
i.e. rationality as an attribute experienced and practised by individual but
interdependent actors as against the rationality on a supra-actor.not neces-
sarily consciously intended or coordinated level - a sort of network - ration¬
ality putting a set of objective behavioral constraints on the participants
in that network.
4. We may summarize the section that follows in one adagium: the modern
democratic welfare State is increasingly characterized by the coincidence of
the aggregation of organized demands and a Virtually steady disaggregation
of organized Supports. Disaggregation of Supports can be seen as the combined
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result of such heterogeneous processes as: the emancipation of the Citizen;
the proliferation of sectional interests; centrifugal tendencies triggered
by the inertia of private and public bureaucracies not able to cope with an
increasingly differentiated environment and prone to react to signs of loss
of externa'l as well as internal control and credibility by over-bureaucrati-
zation; growing opportunities for, and attractivity of, free rider behavior
in decentralized but interdependent Systems; attitudinal changes such as what
Erwin Scheuch (E.K. Scheuch - Wird die Bundesrepublik unregierbar? Köln 1976,
p. 21) calls "Misstrauensvorschuss gegenüber abstrakten Instanzen", and a
more instrumental or utilitaristic attitude among the membership of all kinds
of organizations, in a society leaving practically nothing outside its
organizational grasp; and finally embarrassing loyalty-conflicts associated
with incongruencies between micro, meso and macro representation of the
"same" interest groups or the "same" values. The disaggregation that results
from the combination of these forces may be called the functional fragment-
ation of societal supports.
Secondly, fragmentation of societal Support leads to the following
"paradox-of-participation": the more organizations become decentralized and
divisionalized - be this either for democratic or for purely managerial
reasons of efficiency - the more cumbersome becomes interorganizational
decision-making caused by a decreasing "Kompromisfähigkeit" and shrinking
managerial discretion of the (former) organizational elites or dominant
coalitions within organizations, associations and so on. The paradox of part-
icipation - a paradox because it implies, in extremo, participation in non- •
decision-making brought about by interorganizational avoidance - combined
with the above mentioned tendencies (like free rider behavior, low trust vis
ä vis abstract "authorities", utilitaristic attitudes and cross-loyalties
between micro, meso and macro forms of interest-representation) tend to re-
inforce the kind of institutional distance and separatism that we baptized
before institutional "balkanization".
As suggested, the Overall effect is disaggregation of support. In an
admittedly perverse sense disaggregation-of-support may be seen as the
consequence of a particular System property that Herbert Simon
- in a rather
bptimistic mood - some time ago suggested (H.A. Simon - The Architecture of
Complexity - General Systems Yearbook 10 (1965) 69-70) namely: the more
tightly complex an organization, the closer it moves toward becoming a dis-
aggregative System. Our interpretation, however, may be called a perverse
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Interpretation indeed of this phenomenon, because we would like to ask the
reader's attention for a counter-intuitive consequence of Siraon's therapy for
the Problems of too closely coupled social Systems or organizations. In
Simon's view, social Systems are able to escape from the survival risks in¬
neren t to tight interdependence by deliberately designing, or by making use
of, the existing "near-decomposability" of social Systems. The survival risk
is described as follows: if interdependence between component Subsystems
increases, the System becomes less decomposable; becoming less decomposable
means that should one component fail, the whole System either collapses or
becomes inoperative. Judged from our perspective of the participation-para-
dox, Simon's "solution" (namely: increasing or making optimal use of the
near-decomposability of the System) contains a strong invitation for free
rider behavior, i.e. an ideal breeding ground for the institutional balkan-
ization of commitments and strategies, ultimately leading to non-decision-
making. To make our point clear, let us consider what Simon understands by
nearly decomposable Systems:
x In nearly-decomposable Systems the short-run behavior of each component
Subsystem is approximately independent of the short-run behavior of every
other component Subsystem, whereas
x in the long run the behavior of anyone component Subsystem is dependent in
only an aggregate way on the behavior of the other component Subsystems.
It is exactly this configuration of Short term independence or perhaps
more precisely: the lack of accountability of interdependence (given a long
time span of feedback) and_ the anonimity of aggregate interdependencies that
is apt to lead to selfish, micro-rational behavior; and micro-rational
behavior in turn may lead to "Olsonian" prisoners' dillemmas blocking the
realization of a match between interorganizational or supra-actor logistics
and logics. The underlying mechanism of the systemic disaggregation of
Supports results in a "trained" mismatch between logistics and logics. This
mismatch is a cause and a consequence of institutional balkanization and non-
decision-making.
On the other hand there are Stimuli enough to reinforce a steady
aggregation of demands put forward to centralized welfare State government.
The only (in the malthusian sense) "positive" check on the procreation and
aggregation of organized demands one may think of - given the increasing
complexities of interorganizational Verflechtung - is the fact that in the
•modern welfare State the growth of legal equality seems to be inversely
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related to the growth of legal certainty. Interorganizational complexity in-
creases normative uncertainties. Complexity-induced uncertainty tends to
produce, not to say: tends to rationalize and legitimize a gradual eclips of
accountability. And decreasing accountability reinforces selfish, low-trust
and low respectability behavior vis ä vis centralized authorities (of all
kinds).
Sumraarizing the preceding, a truly ambiguous image eraerges
- ambiguous
while it seems highly uncertain whether this generalized scepsis will
"positively" check and discourage the aggregation of organized demands or not:
independent organizations form complex combinations; the complex combinations
Start in turn to negotiate; the resulting, brittle, negotiated order is
comprised of a collection of conglomerates, interconnected by a network of
unclear commitments and ongoing negotiations. In the sense of Thomas Schel-
ling (Th.C. Schelling - The Strategy of Conflict
- London/Oxford/New York
1969) commitments and negotiations among and between the conglomerates can
be seen as a specimen of "precarious partnership" or "incomplete antagonism".
No unitary hierarchical relationships nor clear-cut principles of accountabil¬
ity or value-based rules of the interorganizational games are available. What
merely seeras available is a possibly converging set of shared strategical
expectations interorganizationally, given the "objective" mutual resources
dependence.
The fringe of free rider opportunities, given by short-term indepen-
dence cum long term interdependence in an only aggregate form, can be profit-
ably exploited in a satisficing mode. Given- in addition
- the paradox-of-
participation, predicting interorganizational stalemate or non-decision-
making, government more frequently is called upon to serve as an arbiter.
Partly by forced decentralization
- in itself a consequence of the require-
ment to cope with an increasingly differentiated and participative task
environment - partly by Substantive involvement in "mixed market" policy
affairs, government willy-nilly is enticed away from a position of neutral
but abstract. authority into the role of partisan and concrete participant in
the eraergent negotiated order. Shifts in role together with scepsis about the
problem-solving capacity of central government tempt the legitimacy of
government Intervention while siraultaneously public interventions increase
in volume as well as in kind. But what counts is that the "authoritative"
component in the production and allocation of societal values unmistakenly
wanes.
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5. Now these observations are not at all new or strikingly original.
Moreover, much of what is said before is highly speculative and clearly
deserves more thorough analysis and specification than would be realistically
feasible in the confines of this short essay. What nevertheless should at
least be considered more closely - in explanatory theory as in political
practice - is the erabarrassing fuzziness of the role of "macro" ideas and
ideology in changing modern society, i.e. the Unterbau-Überbau discussion.
Translating the Unterbau-Überbau dichotomy into an analysis in terms of
strategy-and-structure of interdependent "composite" actors (public authorit-
ies, interest groups, in short the "Organizers" of demands and Supports,
i.e. the "rationalizers" of values and norms on different levels of aggregat-
ion) seeras to raake the Unterbau-Überbau discussion certainly less heroic but
perhaps more manageable, while more operational.
The debate on the (re-)emergence of corporatism may serve as an
illustrative example of the complexities and possibilities involved. Let us
focus the example more specifically on problems of socio-economic change
versus policy making. Or even more narrowly: let us look at the dynamics of
the power-and-rules-of-the-game setting of industrial policy making, consider¬
ed from the perspective developed in the preceding sections.
We say change versus policy-making, because change is conceptualized
as the "objective" transformation of the industrial structures of modern
society, including the power structure implied by the structure of the
economy, whereas policy-making refers to the strategies followed by subject-
ively rational but "objectively" interdependent actors. Adding that the
actors theraselves are composite actors introduces the problem of the complex-
ities of internal decision-making, - a problem of strategy-and-structure in
itself. As exemplified by our participation-paradox, the internal decision-
making complexities have obviously consequences for the inter-actor relation-
ships, and from there for the resulting negotiated order. The resulting
negotiated order teils us something about the precarious or antagonistic mix
of decision-making and non-decision-making in industrial policy affairs.
The paradox-of-participation states: the more truly decentralized an
organization becoraes and, a fortiori, the more heterogeneous the constituency
¦ that an organization tries to organize and to mobilize, the more competitive
the "representative" regime of internal participation will be; and secondly:
the more competitive internal participation is, the more cumbersome inter-
organizational decision-making will be, in extremo leading to institutional
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distance, i.e. to "protectionistic" balkanization. Separatist and protect-
ionist tendencies have a retaliatory capacity. Retaliation can only be check-
ed by consciousness of the Strategie risks involved. The notion of inherent
risks - as pereeived and experienced by the relevant stake-holders thenw
selves, based on the pereeption of resource interdependence - gives birth to
what Schelling labelled precarious partnership or incomplete antagonism.
What consequences does this nrixed-motive game have for the "chances"
or neo-corporatisra? The ingredients of the overall setting of the industrial
policy game seera raore or less clear: crisis-like problems of industrial
excess capacity and international cut-throat competition; strong but "anonym-
ous" (near-decoraposable?) interdependencies but at the same tirae no availabil-
ity of clear-cut, normatively sanetioned rules of the game, let alone
"authoritative" hierarchies or undisputed arbiters. The prevailing climate
seems to be one of elite-nervosity caused by the obvious discomfort of the
combination of, on the one hand, inter-actor non-decision-making, following
from the "paradox-of-partieipation" and, on the other hand, crisis-like
sentiments - a feeling of urgency and a need to react promptly and fundament-
ally - because the problems are obvious and real (although some distrust
-
among the actors
- can be observed concerning the question who exactly
does define, monitor and/or does deliberately undermanage the "real" crises).
6. One of the more promising approaches to the "problem" of corporatism
is the one proposed by Gerhard Lehmbruch, - "promising" while principally
oriented on polisy-making and policy-outputs (G. Lehmbruch, several public-
ations, among thera a recent paper presented at the World Congress of
Sociology at Uppsala Augustus 1979, and one presented at the Congress of the
German Sociological Association, Berlin, April 1979). There are two essent-
ial characteristics in Lehmbruch's approach;
First, the interaction between interest groups and the State can be
seen as governed by a sort of exchange-relationship: the demoeratie require-
raents of consensus and legitimation of public policy, hence its effectiveness,
are possibly fulfilled by the willingness of trade unions to aeeept wage
restraints or other concessions like the rationalization of industries,
included their preparedness to defend and implement those policies vis ä vis
their constituencies in exchange for the willingness of government to follow
union's policy preferences on other issues, like certain training, housing
and public health policies or even more important: government aeeepts union's
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decision-making "executive privilege" in certain policy-areas from which
government promises to abstain and to recognize in this respect the unions
as a sole representative. The exchange-setting may be enriched by introducing
tripartite exchange-relationships, still deserving the label corporatist.
Secondly, the exchange between the promises of governmental non-inter-
ference versus unions' self-discipline presupposes some rationale for a
specific division of labour in policy-making, differentiating and demarcating
the two arenas (i.e. the corporatist versus the parliamentary or party polit-
ical arena). This rational has to be sought in the distinction between
respectively those policies requiring a high degree of consensus, being more
or less irrevocable, and involving externalities, as against those policies
that are less outspoken in th'is sense, showing a more symbolic or ethical
salience. In the latter areas the party-political or parliamentary Channel is
still able to handle the affairs whereas in the former corporatist Solutions
seem more or less unavoidable. Corporatist activism means then even more than
what Böckenförde (E.W. Böckenförde - Die politische Funktion wirtschaftlich¬
sozialer Verbände und Interessenträger in der sozial staatlichen Demokratie
-
in: Die Staat, 15, Band 1976, Heft 4, pp. 457-484) just called "Teilnahme an
der politischen Entscheidungsgewalt".
The exchange-hypothesis is stimulating because it inspires a whole
series of problems and complications
- in the understanding of corporatism -
that otherwise would not become so easily visible. Before summing up some of
the more pertinent complications, more has to be said on the general attitudes
and the ideological undertone in the public debate on corporatism, included
the question whether corporatism "really" exists or tends to reemergence
"again".
7. In the public debate the distinctive boundary between pressure group
politics called "interest group liberalism"
- stressing pluralistic and cen-
trifugal tendencies - and "neo"-corporatism
- stressing cartel-like and
centripetal tendencies - is confusingly vague. Yet logically they seem mutual
opposites: they are opposed in terms of structural composition and process
(functional fragmentation versus cartellization) as well as in terms of the
rules-of-the-game (the Separatist politics of avoidance or non-commitment
versus the collusive politics of accommodation) and in terms of net policy-
outcomes (pluralist ignorance and non-decision-making versus parliament as a
hostage, merely echoing corporatist preferences and irrevocable decisions).
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Part of the contradiction can be solved by specifying the pertinent arena,
i.e. by discriminating between the relevant policy-areas and_ the relevant
levels of institutional aggregation: in some "cases" corporatist momentum
prevails, whereas in some others bureaucratic activism reigns, and again in
other areas parliament, i.e. a pluralistic configuration of, primarily,
political parties (with "generalist" pretentions, though possibly but not
necessarily affiliated with specific client-groups), is predominant.
Calculating the "net" effect of these different regimes and arenas for
the more or less "authoritative allocation of values" for society as a whole
or for social change resulting from the interplay of corporatist, bureaucrat¬
ic and parliamentary strategies-and-structures would be a heroic task indeed.
A more raodest ambition is to study the workings of corporatism where it
demonstrably works - preferably, in Lehmbruch's vein, indicating the bureau-
cratic-and-parliamentary context-of-exchange in which the granting of corpor¬
atist discretion may be expected. The area of industrial politics - besides
the more classical examples of incomes, wage and labour market policies,
seems a good candidate for studying the politics and non-politics of corpor¬
atism. In that sense we agree with those scholars who prefer to reserve the
label corporatist for those types of conflict management and decision-making
that lie in the socio-economic realm of the (re)production of class and State
relationships rather than stretching the concept to "welfare State" policies
in general. In other words, issues related to the division of power in the
socalled "raixed markef-economy, should be our focus.
Yet this restriction sounds easier than it is in practice for two
reasons. First, unions, employers' associations, industry organizations and
financial institutions extend their policy-scope and strategies beyond
production-related matters like investment, employraent, industrial reorganiz-
ation, etcetera, to ever wider policy areas, partly in reaction to the above-
mentioned expansion of welfare State intervention and the disputes associated
w-ith State intervention in general. This may be called politicization and
political Professionalization of private actors in their dealings with the
State, blurring the boundary between "strictly" socio-economic and welfare
State policies in general. This precisely lends additional plausibility and
relevance to the "macro"-emphasis in Lehmbruch's exchange-hypothesis, though
complicating the analysis enormously.
A second factor complicating the demarcation between "strictly"
production-related policy areas and policy making in general, stems from the
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macro-ideological connotations of corporatism and the historical ambitions of
corporatist thinkers, politicians, etcetera. In a straightforward doctrinary
sense "pure" corporatism assumes or represents, at least, three dogmas:
- neither class conflict nor competitive behavior are accepted as organizing
principles of social order; social order
- instead - has to be seen as the
harmonious outcome of the "laws" of organic solidarity reflecting comple-
mentarity and symmetry ranging from micro institutions like the family and
the enterprise to macro institutions like the econoray and the State;
- State and society are intertwined or interpenetrated to such a high degree
that practically no distinction between the body politic and the Gemein-
schaft remains; and finally,
- by a deliberate act of State or by natural law it follows logically that
complementary or parallel interest-groups are bestowed with public legal,
exclusive rights in exchange for observing internal discipline of their
memberships, Clients or constituencies.
Now, on the one hand, - leaving nuances out - two politico-philosophic-
al caraps
- quite dissimilar in other respects
- share a comition disliking of
corporatism or, more cautiously - corporatist "tendencies". First, liberals
- mainly from a public law background
- warn against corporatist sapping of
the sovereign State or the sovereign parliament. Iraplicitly or explicitly
their sixth sense appears to be selectively sensitive for unions' strength as
a factual or potential obstruction of parliamentary primacy. Secondly, we can
mention marxist scholars who reject corporatism, old or new, while they
consider the corporatist creed as an elite-strategy devoted to the cover up
or outright suppression of class conflicts between labour and capital,
- thus
delaying the incidentally immanent break-down of capitalism.
On the other hand, outspokenly positive adherents of the corporatist
legacy have to be sought in confessional economists' circles embracing
corporatism as the bridge between or the panacee against the evils of social-
ist and capitalist extremity. While marxists and liberals see corporatism as
a problem affecting democratic hygiene and affronting parliamentary supremacy,
confessional theoreticians and to a lesser degree some socialist sub-doctrines
see corporatism as a potential political problem-solving or societal tension-
management device. At this place we can not refine these admittedly gross
contrasts by stressing - for instance
- the important distinction between
those that see corporatism primarily as a form of State, supplying political
order or control versus those that see corporatism primarily as an ideological-
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annex-organizational device for managing the socio-economic division of
labour, hence as a specimen of economic order or control.
Proponents as well as opponents, however, adhere strongly to a dicho-
tomous approach in the analysis casu quo prescriptive representation of
(anti-)corporatism - probably influenced by the supposed assuraption or "law"
of symmetrical or complementary attributes cind interactions between micro
organizations and macro institutions. If one uses the concepts of organizat-
ion and institution - each indicating a specific level of aggregation - as
the raore or less stable concurrence of an Überbau (the structure of under-
standing-and-values) and an Unterbau (the structure of interaction-and-
power), a double dichotoray appears to govern the current discussion. First,
the pros and cons of corporatisra are discussed in terms of the (elective)
correspondence between micro and macro principles or organization and,
secondly, the focus is on the (elective) correspondence between Überbau
(values) and Unterbau (relations of production and reproduction, patterns of
interaction, structure of power).
8. On both dimensions we propose to
"
treak" the deterministic circle of
symmetry, or correspondence. On the contrary, we propose to admit.first, for
the possibility of at least three levels of aggregation (i.e. to include meso
forms of institutionalization) and, secondly, to admit for the possibility of
contrary logics on the three levels of aggregation, - leading to possible
discrepancies in the principles-of-organization for each level ^nd to possible
discrepancies between logistics (resource interdependencies casu quo power-
structure or Unterbau) and logics (Zweck- and Wertrationalität: value struct¬
ure or Überbau).
Admitting for discrepancies on both dimensions - i.e. for contradict-
ory principles of organization and mobilization on three levels of interest
aggregation ^nd a possibly net and enduring "mismatch" between Uberbau-
rationalizations and Unterbau-realities, relaxes the deterministic and dicho-
toraous macro-micro bias in current analyses. But the price seems fairly high:
admitting for contradictions between logistics and logics across the three
levels, complicates the analysis of the politico-economic order seriously.
what, above, is called the principle of organization and mobilization,
differing from level to level, underlies the phenomenon that we described
earlier as the gradual eclips of accountability. Accountability tends to wane
when to conditions coincide: increasing interorganizational dependence and a
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lack of normatively shared and authoratively sanctioned rules by which the
interorganizational garae will be played. This coincidence was said to be an
ideal breeding ground for strategies and tactics of non-commitment, resulting
in institutional balkanization and interorganizational hostage or non-
decision-making. Non-decision-making was explained by introducing the paradox-
of-participation, hypothesizing a negative correlation hetween internal and
external participation, decentralization and the re-coordination of function-
ally decentralized structures and strategies.
On the micro (organizational) level a "zweckrational" regirae of util-
itaristic exchanges between inter-related interest prevails. On this leyel of
aggregation the sheer feasibility of quid-pro-quo accountability predicts a
tough and operational confrontation between opposing interests. On the other
hand.on the macro-societal level of interest articulation,-
the pervasive lack
of unambiguous quid-pro-quo accountability seeras to create a "wertrational"
battle-ground for mainly symbolic, i.e. less operational confrontations
between opposing interests, stressing the moral legitimacy rather than the
instrumental rationality diraension of accountability.
The level-specific eraphasis either on syrabolic legitiraacy or on oper¬
ational rationality and quid-pro-quo questions reminds us of Lehmbruch's
assessment of different policies handled in different arenas, i.e. some are
"typically" manageable for the parliamentary arena whereas others "belong" to
the corporatist Channel, included his Suggestion of possible trade-offs
between the prerogatives or predilections of both worlds.
Our perspective, however, suggesting a macro blas towards legitiraacy
and a micro bias towards utilitaristic strategies leaves open a large grey
zone, i.e. the interorganizational raeso-level where the mixed "blessings" of
two conditions hold - making the exchange-hypothesis and the resulting type of
negotiated order somewhat more complicated, while unstable. These two condit¬
ions are, not really surprisingly any more: no clear salience of conceptions
of legitimacy,i.e. no shared values but rather shared expectations concerning
Strategie inter-actor behavior; and, secondly, a vaguely known but concretely
feit mutual dependence between the protagonists. We say protagonists rather
than antagonists or partners, because it is on this "grey" raeso level that the
basic ingredients of Schelling's mixed motive game becorae relevant, i.e. the
level where "incomplete antagonism" or "precarious partnership" define the un-
comfortable play.
Rather than a sort of exchange between the macro Symbols of politiciz-
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ation (die Moral) and the micro realities of class confrontation (das Fres¬
sen) we postulate, institutionally speaking, an "open" space between the
micro and macro level that seems,
- by the very ambiguity of the mix of
legitimacy and rationality on this level -, "appropriate" for the convergence-
of-expectations and the emergence-of-collusive behavior. In Schelling's
approach this may be called "tacit coordination" - even without extensive
communication between the interdependent actors, "merely" derived from a
gradually evolving, mutual (rather than consensually shared) perception of the
structure of opportunities and strategies-to-be-expected from the bargaining
counterparts. From here, it is but one step to call these politics-of accomod-
ation, - essentially the product of a set of mutually shared perceptions and
strategical expectations - , the politics of incrementalistic corporatisni.
9. The term "increraentalistic" is used because of the gradual, bounded
rational and non-apriori planned form of the negotiated order, emerging from
interorganizationally shared expectations and from strategies based on mutual
expectations.
For reasons of brevity we may, of course, speak of "neo-"corporatism,
provided we refer consistently and explicitly to five interrelated but dis-
tinguishable attributes differentiating "neo" from "old" corporatism:
First, the modern form of corporatism is incrementalistic and emerging
rather than synoptically intended, wanted or expected as was principally the
case with orthodox or classical corporatism.
Second, the modern variety tends to be non-conspicuous and pragmatic-
ally oriented, i.e. averse from the hegemonial aspirations and the solemn,
ideological gospel of "pure" corporatism.
Third, in terms of aggregation, the expected "locus" of the neo-corpor-
atist politics-of-accommodation will be the meso level rather than the pur-
portedly interchangeable, while "symmetrical" micro-and-macro level on which
"pure" corporatism was expected or implanted formerly. Rather than postulating
symmetry and interchangeability between the respective levels, we hypothesize
strong contradictions between the strategies-and-structure on each level of
interest aggregation, i.e. we expect the "applicability" of neo-corporatism
on the meso level only.
Fourth, because of the "total" ambitions (and sometimes practices) of old
corporatism, the distinction between state-induced versus bourgeois- or
private elite-induced corporatism may have been, historically, a relevant
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distinction. Howeyer, under modern welfare State conditions, as we see it,
this distinction ceases to be of any help because of the restrictedly meso,
non-"exportable" character of neo-corporatism. On the meso level of the
corporatist politics-of-accomraodation, privately organized interests and the
body politic or bureaucratic produce, so to say, each other's behavioral pre-
conditions to such a degree that it is no longer feasible or hei pfui to try
to distinguish between prime movers or instigators. To borrow once more Schel-
ling's phrase: The tripartite "precarious partnership"
- based on mutual
hostage-by-vital-resource interdependence, guarantees a kind of collusive
behavior or tacit coordination between the "incomplete antagonists"
- without
assuming extensive conspiratory moves. This tacit coordination blurs the very
distinction between public (state) en private (society) initiative. The dist¬
inction itself has to become "incomplete" in order to stop Short of complete,
mutually destructive war. This, but only this constrained type of forced
accoramodation should be called "neo"-corporatist.
Finally, the prefix "neo" should be used in the sense of "pseudo" or
"hybrid", while stressing the Janus-head of neo-corporatism: as a direct con-
sequence of the precariousness and
- politically speaking
- the hauntingly
cognitive dissonance of this negotiated order, there has to be a necessary
difference between words-and-deeds. This difference makes for the stealthy,
non-ideological, rather "disguised" character of the meso politics-of accora¬
modation. That means that the Symbols and paraphernalia of corporatism (as an
institution or device for handling class conflicts and coordinating policies)
have to be avoided at any price, while the factual accommodation strategies
resemble the basic tenets and mixed motive game of corporatism. Partly for
the historical, fascist and anti-parlementarian connotations of corporatism,
partly for the "cognitive dissonance" caused by significant cross-loyalties
for politicians, labour-representatives and "representatives" of financial
and industrial capital on the different levels of interest representation
-
any public Suggestion or open demonstration of corporatist sympathies and
practices has to be avoided.
Especially the problem of intra-actor cross-loyalties on different
levels of interest aggregation (i.e. firm, industry or region, and macro-
economic policies) is worth mentioning in this context, because
- as seen be-
fore - the "paradox-of-participation" states that internal differentiation and
participative decentralization mortgage interorganizational accommodation
across actors. The latter mechanism tends to be the more precarious and anta-
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gonistic under conditions of economic contraction and forced structural re-
organization of complete industrial sectors. The dilemmas - for the respect-
ive stake-holders - of "exit-voice-and-loyalty" are clear under these condit¬
ions, especially concerning the visibie forraation or avoidance of tripartite
commitments and subsequent accountability. The case of the employers'
associations provides a good illustration of the dileramas involved. Essential-
ly they have to make a choice from several, structurally opposed games,
depending on their policy priorities, internal discipline, Short- versus
long-sightedness, etcetera, - in Short depending on the chances of the emerg-
ing interfirm expectations shared on the basis of existing resource-inter-
dependencies (i.e. the structure of the "relevant" industry determining the
structure of strategical opportunities and risks).
Whether or not publicly or institutionally recognized as such, most
industrial disputes and class conflicts are tripartite games, not in the sense
of sorae harmonious kind of private-private-public consultation and coordinat-
ion, but in the above suggested style of a Strategie calculus in which each
actor (e.g. capital) "invites" another actor (e.g. labour) to serve as a shield
against a third actor (e.g. the treasury or a financial House Committee). The
strongest player in this setting is the actor that can "commute" between
several games or several (differently coraposed) arenas: for instance, the
"employment game" (relevant for the labour-intensive but declining industries,
or industries closely connected to governmental infrastrueture-spending)
versus the "advanced know-how" or "international competitive advantage"-game.
For diversified and raulti-divisional firms, political resourcefulness and
hence maneuvrability result from multiple arena-membership. ßut - and that
is the exit-voiee-loyalty dilerama in a capitalist economic order flanked by
a welfare State antinomy of the aggregation-of-demands and the disaggregation
of Supports -, multiple arena-membership or multiple gamesmanship is not
"synergetic" from itself. In "Olsonian" terms the dilemma remains whether the
inciusive or the exclusive games will be chosen. Following Olson's usage (the
Logic of Collective Action) the exclusive game refers to "market groups", like
competitors, having an objeetive interest in minimizing the size of the group
of partieipants on the market (theoretical Optimum pure monopoly) whereas the
inclusive game refers to "non-market groups", trying to maximize the group of
partieipants in order to be effective, under relatively low or declining costs
and increasing marginal returns, like in the case of merging trade-unions or
entrepreneurs lobbying for government subsidies, protectionistic measures, or
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tax reduction. The crux of the matter is that the same group of firms may
have to make the strategical choice between the inclusiye (e.g. employment-)
game versus the exclusive (e.g. technological innovation-) game. This
dilemma
explains the prevalence of policy-paralysis or non-decision-making in quite a
few cases of industrial reorganization, although theoretically
- given mult¬
iple arena-membership
- the former game can be used by sophisticated strateg-
ists to cross-subsidize the latter game. But the paradox-of-participation,
associated with loyalty-conflicts, favouring short-term quid-pro-quo strateg-
ies and low-trust or scepsis about the feasibility of accountable "exchanges"
-
may frustrate the materialization of this theoretical Option.
10. Considering these persistent ambiguities
- leading to the above-mention-
ed summary of five attributes, deemed to differentiate "neo"-corporatism as
precarious partnership and incomplete antagonism from "pure" corporatism
-
one Starts to wonder whether the original "exchange" thesis can still be seen
as a realistic paradigm. The thesis states in essence: public actors and
organized private interests negotiate on formal prerogatives and Substantive
policies in exchange for observing
- on the private side
- internal discipline
and - on the public side - non-interference and institutional-financial
support. The complexity and ambiguities inyolved in multiple arena-membership
cast some doubts on the applicability or manageability of such a rationalist-
ic, quasi-synoptic paradigm as proposed by the exchange-theorists. Perhaps
these doubts are a consequence of the example chosen, namely industrial policy
and politics, as opposed to somewhat more "calculable" policies like wage,
income, tax and perhaps even (re-)training policies. Sometimes even the very
example of industrial politics is mentioned to show the limits of exchange: in
such industries - suffering from excess-capacity, cyclical rigidities and
pending mass lay-offs
- like steel, synthetic fibres, textile, shipbuilding,
etcetera, labour unions are said not to have any choice but accepting the un-
avoidable "laws" of the (inter-)national market. Consequently there is suppos-
edly nothing to be "exchanged". The opposite, however, seems to be the case.
First, in these examples the exchange-platform has to be extended to include
the E.E.C.-authorities, i.e; cross-nation exchanges in the enactment of regi¬
onal and sectoral policies on the european level assume a Strategie potential.
Or even stronger: the sheer international setting induces
- on the national
level - strong collusive tripartite propensities, i.e. favours the "inclusive"
game vis ä vis Brüssels. Although there remain the sort of ambiguities associ-
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ated with each exchange the principies of exchange, as well as the principles
of the "precarious negotiated order" sketched before in a purely national
context, keep their relevance. Also from the purely national perspective
there are additional reasons - in the example of declining industries - to
expect the take-off of elaborate exchanges. The example of the french steel
industry shows that the shut-down of the steel factories is definitely not
accepted but for the state-subsidized promise to take care of compensatory
employraent, while the exchange-setting is "doubled" by the fact that the State
itself is involved in an elaborate exchange-and-poker game between the potent-
ial employers/investors/producers, naraely Renault/Peugeot versus Ford, who
have to fear each other's eligibility for the available public funds.
11. Let us summarize the discussion by a couple of conclusions. The ex-
change-perspective and frora there the "face" of neo-corporatism should be re-
fined by introducing several levels of interest aggregation. The differential
applicability and possibility to monitor exchanges on different levels and in
different policy-arenas tend to make the meso-level appropriate for the
otherwise uncomfortable, ideologically sensitive politics-of-accommodation
that may be called "neo"-corporatist, provided we emphasize the structural,
processual and ideological (value)differences with orthodox corporatisra. On
the micro and the macro level of interest representation we expect - judged
from the same criteria of accountability - patterns of interaction and con-
flict management between opposing interests that are more radical or anti-
accoramodation oriented. Institutional balkanization between the respective
decision-making levels allows for ("neutralizes") the enduring coexistence of
contrary logics of action and for en-iuring discrepancies between the logistics
of objective resource interdependence (power structure) and the Symbolic
loqics used to rationalize this interdependence (value structure).
Discrepancies between power structure (Unterbau) and value structure
(Überbau) are not just possibie (for instance by assuming - in the case of
social change - "merely" tirae lags in their mutual adaptation) but possibly a
permanent feature of modern society as far as vertical immunization or balkan¬
ization of the different levels of interest aggregation disturbs or even
blocks the selective correspondence between the two "faces" of social reality.
Neo-corporatism - the corporatist politics-of-accommodation-and ex¬
change - seems to play an increasingly vital role indeed in the maintenance
of this brittle negotiated order, provided we look for it on the most probable
level of aggregation, i.e. from the most probable configuration of resource
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dependencies and symbolic rules of the game. The jrppact, howeyer, should be
studied on the micro as well as raacro level of the allocation of values.
One normative conclusion finally. Given the above-sketched conditions
of the aggregation of demands and disaggregation of Support, a democratical-
ly uncontrollable meso-zone of collusive, corporatist politics was said to
eraerge. The raost realistic countermove seems to be the promotion of the manag-
eraent-of-devolution of interorganizational linkages - rather than trying to
change the structure of values. As far as it is plausible that there may exist
large discretionary margins between Überbau and Unterbau, investing political
energy in changing the structure of values approaches Don Quixote. In that
case, rather the structural or resource-pararaeters of the mixed tnotive garae,
leading to tacit coordination and corporatist collusion, should be made uiore
"precarious" indeed.
Delft, 24 juli 1979
